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1CHAPTER 1 
 
MOTIVATION 
 
According to game theory, a dominant strategy of Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 
defecting (Epstein, 1997). Online trading between two strangers falls in the realm of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Yamamoto et al, 2003). Needless to mention, failure should be the 
only logical conclusion of such electronic commerce situation since a trader might never 
have to deal with the same buyer again given the enormous population of online traders. 
Thus one could argue that markets like eBay should never exist. Then what is the reason 
behind resounding success of such electronic markets?  The answer lies in the 
reputation system that they established. Market reputation means a lot to the trading 
community, simply because it directly impacts their business prospects. It is thus the 
driving force behind responsible behavior of the otherwise selfish online traders. 
In fact, importance of reputation is recognized by those outside the trading 
community as well. People in general are more likely to shy away from irresponsible 
behavior if their reputation is at stake. ‘Google page rankings’ and reader reviews on 
various sites like Amazon.com and Epinions.com are some other examples of the 
reputation system pointing towards enormous influence that they wield in our everyday 
life. This research thus attempts to analyze importance of reputation system in online 
trading using Agent Based Simulation. 
Although it is evident that increased co-operation between online traders is 
critically important for improved performance of electronic markets, it is very difficult 
to sustain cooperation among online traders since defect-defect is the only Nash 
2equilibrium for the online trading when modeled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Scali, 2006). 
In absence of any rules and regulations, breakdown of these electronic markets is 
inevitable. The problem then boils down to setting up a framework of rules and 
regulations that can ensure the success of such electronic markets. For example, system 
designers at eBay introduced the concept of feed back score. Feed back score of a 
particular trader increases by one when he cooperates with his trading partner and gets 
the reward of positive feedback. Similarly, feedback score of a trader reduces by one if 
an online trader defects in order to get higher payoff, thus facing the wrath of his trading 
partner expressed in terms of negative feedback. Each negative feedback brings down 
the feedback score of a trader and the neutral feedback leaves the score unchanged.  
Trust can be considered as the single most important factor that makes the online 
trading possible simply because an online trader has no other means to verify the quality 
of the product or genuineness of his trading partner (Dellarocas, 2000). The most 
common online trading problems being buyer receiving an inferior quality of the 
product or seller receiving delayed and/or insufficient payment for the products he sold. 
The problem of seller and/or buyer not abiding by the contractual commitments is so 
overwhelming that a trader with relatively low feedback score gets quickly branded as 
untrustworthy. Such a trader is obviously loathed in the online trading community and is 
unlikely to find a trading partner unless he undertakes an uphill task of improving his 
feedback rating. Needless to mention, the most attractively priced product offered by a 
trader with low feedback score usually fails to lure buyers because buyers are more 
likely to buy the similar product at a higher price from a reputable trader with higher 
feedback score. 
3Although the significance of reputation system is obvious, finding answers to 
some of the what-if scenarios can be very puzzling. For example, what if past mistakes 
of the traitor are absolved and more importance is given to his/her recent co-operative 
behavior in order to motivate him/her to co-operate? What if the perceived reliability of 
reputation system decreases substantially? Would online traders stop co-operating with 
each other as a result of decreased reliability of reputation system? If yes, would it be 
possible to quantify the effect of perceived reliability of the reputation system on the co-
operative behavior of the online traders?  
Impact of these changed conditions on the performance of an electronic market 
would largely depend on the dynamic behavior of the complex interactions between 
many interdependent agents. This research tries to answer the aforementioned questions 
by employing ‘Agent Based Simulation Modeling’ approach. Agent based modeling is 
essential for this problem because global effects of locally interacting agents are very 
useful in strategic planning. The complex behavior of a system as a whole emerges from 
interactions of large number of online traders in an adaptable system. An adaptable 
system is characterized by an ability to automatically improve its performance over time 
in response to what has happened in the past. In other words, complex system actively 
tries to make the best out of whatever happens. 
Answers to these questions could be crucial in predicting the change in the 
behavior of the online traders in response to the policy changes adopted by e-commerce 
companies. Understanding behavioral aspects of online traders would certainly be 
helpful in ensuring respectability and long term stability of the electronic markets.  
4This thesis thus attempts to establish a trust based reputation system and analyze 
its effect on the sustainability of mutual cooperation between online traders by taking 
into account key factors like level of gullibility of online traders and the weight of 
influence given to their past behavior.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Relevant Topics of Interest 
Since agent based modeling of online trading, in this thesis, is based on Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), past research done in the areas of both agent based modeling 
as well as Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is discussed in this section. Furthermore, a 
literature review is also done for evolution of cooperation and adaptive processes. 
Agents in this thesis use some of the standard IPD strategies to interact with each other 
so various IPD strategies and agent interactions are reviewed in detail too.  
2.2 Agent Based Modeling Vs Equation Based Modeling 
Agent Based Modeling is a computational methodology that allows the analyst 
to create, analyze and experiment with artificial worlds populated by agents that interact 
in non-trivial ways (Cederman, 1997). Agent Based Modeling helps to fill the gap 
between formal but restrictive models and wide ranging but imprecise qualitative 
frameworks. 
Agent Based Modeling however, differs significantly from traditional Equation 
Based Modeling. Various entities in the system are represented by group of agents in 
Agent Based Modeling. Each agent is a software programs that imitate the behavior of 
system entities. On the contrary, a system is represented by mathematical equations in 
Equation Based Modeling and the system behavior is determined by solving them.  
(Dutta et al, 2006). 
6Some of the basic differences between the two approaches are summarized in 
the Table 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1: Differences between Equation Based and Agent Based Modeling 
 
Principle 
 
EBM 
 
ABM 
Building block 
Feedback loop 
connecting 
Behavioral 
variables 
Individual agents 
connected by feedback 
loop 
Object of 
interest 
 
Structure of the 
system 
 
Agent’s rules 
 
Research approach Deductive: Infer from structure to 
behavior 
 
Inductive: Infer from 
individual agent’s behavior 
to system Behavior 
 
Development of 
object of interest 
over time 
 
Structure is fixed Agent’s rules can be adaptive 
 
Handling of time 
 
Continuous 
Simulation 
 
Discrete or continuous 
simulation 
 
As mentioned in Table 2.1, another fundamental difference between Agent 
Based Modeling and Equation Based Modeling is the granularity of the model focus. 
Agent Based Modeling relies on the agent interactions at the grass root level, on the 
contrary Equation Based Modeling tends to make use of system level observables.  
2.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Agents in this research deal with each other using IPD (Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma) strategies. Thus it is imperative to review the past work done in this area. At 
7the outset, let us first take a quick look at classic prisoner’s dilemma game. The 
prisoner’s dilemma game was first formalized by Tucker (Tucker, 1950). It is widely 
used in modeling problems in Social Science. Socio-economic applications of prisoner’s 
dilemma include: collusion between firms, trade barriers between countries, and public 
goods problems. The basic Prisoner’s dilemma is a two player game. Each player has a 
choice of either cooperating or defecting. Thus, the two agent prisoner’s dilemma game 
is an abstraction of social situations where each agent is faced with two alternative 
actions: cooperating, i.e. doing a socially responsible thing and defecting i.e. acting 
according to self interest regardless of how harmful this might be to other agent. 
Although each agent is better off defecting regardless of the opponent’s choice, the sum 
of the agents’ payoffs is maximized if both agents choose to cooperate, and thus the 
dilemma. In game theoretic terms, defecting is a dominant strategy of the game and so 
the defect-defect action combination is the only dominant strategy equilibrium (and 
therefore also the only Nash equilibrium). On the other hand, social welfare is 
maximized at cooperate-cooperate action combination; if social welfare is defined to be 
the equi-weighted sum of the agents’ payoffs. Table 2.2 shows a payoff matrix for a two 
player game, where each agent has two possible actions. Values in parenthesis are used 
in the experiments of this research. These are the payoffs that can be typically found in 
the literature.  
 
8Table 2.2: Payoff Matrix for the Row Player 
 
Column Player 
Cooperate(C) Defect(D)
Cooperate(C) R ( 3 ) S ( 0 )Row  
Player
Defect(D) T ( 5 ) P ( 1 ) 
Note that the payoff matrix describes a PD game if the following inequalities 
hold: 
 
T > R > P > S
and 
2R > T + S > 2P 
 
Negotiations, before, during or after the Prisoner’s Dilemma game are not 
allowed. Agents do not commit to any action, and agents’ payoffs are non transferable. 
2.4 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Since agents usually deal with each other more than once in real life, social 
interactions can be modeled more effectively by repeated PD games. This super game of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is called the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. The 
IPD game structure captures dilemma between defecting with the hope to get high 
payoff and the cooperation resulting in smaller individual benefit. In iterated prisoner’s 
9dilemma, an agent’s strategy is a result of its own and its opponent’s past moves. Unlike 
pure strategy, an agent chooses its action stochastically from a distribution in a mixed 
strategy. 
2.5 Evolution of Cooperation 
In an IPD game, even a selfish agent is forced to cooperate on some of the 
iterations in order to seek cooperation from its opponent. If the number of iterations of 
the PD game in an IPD game is known, then the last iteration becomes the standalone 
PD game. So in the last iteration each agent is motivated to defect, because both agents 
know that the opponent is going to defect on the last round any way. The backward 
induction can be carried out all the way to the beginning of the interaction. Thus in 
some sense it is rational to defect throughout the sequence (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
Thus given these payoffs, it can be easily shown that mutual defection is the only Nash 
equilibrium (it is also dominant strategy equilibrium). Of course, the intrigue of the 
prisoner’s dilemma is that this unique equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the mutual 
cooperation outcome. If the basic Prisoner’s dilemma is iterated for a finite but 
unknown number of times, or it is played for an infinite number of times with payoff 
averaging, then cooperative outcomes can theoretically emerge. In fact the Folk theorem 
implies that with sufficiently little discounting, any individually rational outcome can be 
supported as a (sub game perfect) Nash equilibrium. Since fixed horizon IPD games 
have this characteristic, the agents in this research interact with each other using IPD 
strategies with an indefinite horizon i.e. the agents do not know how many iterations are 
still to come. 
10 
Deciding the best strategy for iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is quite difficult 
since it calls for consideration of arbitrarily long input histories. A couple of approaches 
have been used to address this problem. 
• Next action is based only on fixed amount of previous moves. 
• Some numeric indicator representing entire history of moves is tracked 
throughout the game. 
Two classical examples of the first approach are the pure strategies called Tit-
for-Tat (TFT) and PAVLOV. A player using TFT cooperates on the first move and then 
mirrors its opponent’s previous move. Although simple, TFT has been proven to be very 
successful in evolutionary IPD experiments (Axelrod, 1984). PAVLOV cooperates if 
and only if the agents chose the same action on the previous move. In evolutionary IPD 
games with certain random disturbances PAVLOV outperforms TFT (Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1993). However both TFT and PAVLOV have certain inherent limitations. 
TFT ignores the older history, and PAVLOV gives an abstraction of the true state but 
the important details may be lost.  
The search for an appropriate way to model the strategic choices of agents has 
been a central topic in the study of game theory. While a variety of approaches have 
been used, few of them have explicitly incorporated notions of learning and adaptation. 
Rubinstein (Rubinstein, 1986) analyzed meta-agents who optimized their selection of 
strategies constrained by the costs of implementing such strategies. This approach can 
be developed by modeling the meta-agent’s choice through genetic algorithm. As a 
simple example of this approach co-evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma problem can be analyzed with perfect and imperfect reporting. In imperfect 
11 
reporting (Miller 1996), a noise level of X% indicates that X% of the time an 
opponent’s move is reported to be the opposite of what the opponent actually did, while 
the remainder of the time this move is perfectly transmitted. For this notion of reporting 
noise to make sense in the context of iterated game, an aggregation of sub-game payoffs 
is required (otherwise the payoff information will be sufficient to reveal the actual 
move). However, the possibility of imperfect reporting is not included in this research. 
Typically, populations starting with a random sample of strategies go through 
cycles. Initially, ‘Traitors’ feed on ‘Loyals’ in the population. It pays for the Traitors to 
defect since Loyals fail to retaliate against defections. However, sufficient number of 
Practical (Tit-For-Tat) players resulting from chance mutations begin playing each other 
frequently and invade the mutual defectors. Eventually the population moves to mutual 
cooperation (Axelrod 1984, Nowak and May, 1992). As TFT becomes dominant, 
cooperative strategies start proliferating by genetic drift, since TFT and similar 
strategies won’t take advantage of them (Boyd and Richardson, 1987). As the 
proportion of cooperative Loyals increases relative to the number of TFT like strategies, 
the population becomes more and more susceptible to invasion by Traitors. Eventually 
the Traitors proliferate, when their large payoffs from the Loyals leads to higher 
fitnesses than even Practical players. Then the cycle repeats itself, as the average payoff 
falls in a population of mutual defectors. 
12 
2.6 Adaptive Processes 
An adaptive process controls how agents adapt or learn over time. There are two 
ways to model players who learn adaptively while deciding their strategies. The first is 
imitative approach that allows players to exactly copy the best performing strategies. 
This is implemented when players decide their strategy by copying the strategy of the 
most profitable player that is known to them. This approach of imitation is based on 
learning heuristic. A player tends to copy the strategy of the better performing player 
because he thinks that it is going to work better than his current, poor performing 
strategy. Imitation is the commonly studied adaptive process in the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma literature, either explicitly (Nakamura, Matsuda and Iwasa, 1997) or implicitly 
via replicator dynamics (Nowak and May, 1992). It is worth taking note that the player 
might or might not have access to the complete information about the profitability of all 
the players around them. They are thus required to make the decision depending upon 
the information that they have. It is assumed that players have information about 
profitability of all the other players in this research. 
The second approach is an innovative approach, whereby players form new 
programs by combining different parts of existing strategies along with some unique 
modifications. This approach is derived from genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975). 
Genetic algorithm is used for solving optimization problems in difficult domains. 
However, this approach is not used in this research. 
13 
2.7 IPD Strategies 
The player playing IPD have different options of strategies. For example, Loyal 
(always cooperate), Traitor (always defect), TFT (Tit for Tat i.e. cooperate on the first 
move and then mirror the opponent’s last move), Anti-TFT (Just opposite of TFT), 
PAVLOV (Win Stay Lose Switch i.e. to cooperate if and only if the other player 
chooses the same action on the previous move), Trigger (cooperate till the other player 
cooperates and always defect thereafter), Punish Twice (cooperate till other player 
cooperates, if the other player defects, then defect exactly twice irrespective of his 
moves and then cooperate again), GTFT (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) i.e. Generous Tit 
for Tat (like TFT it cooperates after the opponent has cooperated in the previous round 
but also it cooperates with some probability after opponent has defected) etc. 
The players in IPD are often modeled as a Moore Machine which can be 
described by four elements. The machine consists of a set of internal states. One of these 
states is designated as the starting state, and serves as the initial state of the machine. 
Every internal state has associated with it a single strategic action, i.e. in IPD, every 
state indicates whether the machine will cooperate or defect during the next period. 
Finally there is a transition function associated with each internal state that determines 
the next internal state given the reported action of the opponent.   
Per Axelrod (Axelrod 1998), since the overall success of a strategy depends on 
its performance over the mix of others encountered, there is no strategy that is best 
against all possible populations of others. For example in a world of all Practical Players 
(TFTs), a single traitor is ruined. It is precisely because the mix of others encountered is 
so crucial that variation in interacting structures can play a large role in the emergence 
14 
of a particular strategy. The dynamics of the system are not directly determined by 
global proportions of strategy types, but rather by who is meeting who on a local scale, 
and how the agents adapt to the resulting experience. 
This research employs three of the aforementioned strategies: Loyal, TFT and 
Traitor. It is evident that full cooperation can not be sustained unless an external policy 
is enforced on the supply chain. Thus policy of ‘Track Record Score’ (TRS) is 
introduced in this research to achieve robust cooperation among players. 
2.8 Interaction Processes 
Different interaction processes can lead to emergence of different strategies 
among the players. There are several interaction processes which can be used to 
generate nonrandom interactions among players including – 
• Cost of complexity is applied to TFT strategy (Imhof et al, 2005) with the 
modified payoff matrix, evolutionary oscillations has been observed among all 
three strategies (AllC, AllD, TFT). 
• Players can be more inclined towards interacting with nearby Players ([Nowak 
and May, 1992], [Oliphant, 1994], [Hoffman and Waring, 1996] and [Cohen et 
al, 1998]). 
• Players resort to tag mediated partner selection (Riolo, 1998) Players in these 
models are always in search of acceptable partners to play the IPD. 
• Players remember the past moves of other players and can bias their 
interactions based on behavior of particular player in the past ([Stanley et al, 
15 
1994]). For example, players might just ostracize those who have ever defected 
against anyone. 
• When a defector gets punished by another player adopting altruistic 
punishment, then both defector as well as punisher incurs some cost (Boyd et 
al, 2003). With the modified payoff structure, altruistic punishment has been 
shown to evolve in populations engaged in one time anonymous interactions. 
 
The aforementioned approaches do report sustenance of cooperation in some 
cases. For example, Hauk (Hauk, 1996) concludes that due to partner selection 
cooperative behavior is immune to invading mutants. However, these approaches may 
not be always applicable in the supply chain context, for example: a specific spatial 
topology may promote cooperation but it might be impractical for the arrangement of 
players in the supply chain context. Social tags may prove to be useful to make players 
cooperate with each other but the concept of ‘tagging’ individuals may not be applicable 
in every scenario, similarly the luxury of choosing the partner may not be always 
available to the players because of other business constraints. Thus this research 
attempts to use some practically applicable concepts such at Track Record Score (TRS) 
to promote the cooperation among players. The concept of Track Record Score is 
explained in detail in the following section. 
16 
CHAPTER 3 
 
AGENT BASED SIMULATION 
3.1 Agent Based Modeling 
An Agent Based Simulation Modeling approach is employed in this thesis to 
model the electronic commerce situation described in the Motivation section. Although 
mathematical formalization is more popular among researchers, application of 
mathematical modeling in social sciences usually involves numerical treatment of 
various kinds of complex differential equations. Needless to mention, use of 
mathematical equations typically leads to a very complex solution. On the contrary, 
graphical representation available in the agent based simulation is much easier to 
understand and thus assists in the better analysis of the problem. 
An Agent, as depicted in Figure 3.1 below, is nothing but a computer program 
that is designed to imitate human behavior. Every agent is autonomous and has his own 
perception of the surrounding world. An agent’s behavior is usually defined by set of 
simple rules. Within the framework of those rules, an agent independently decides how 
to interact with other agents and tries to achieve his personal goal in the least amount of 
time. Thus the inherent uncertainty characterized by all the multi-agent systems (also 
called complex adaptive systems) can be attributed to the fact that future actions of 
other agents are essentially not known, just as in real life.  
17 
Figure 3.1: Agent in the Simulation Model 
 
Agent based simulation is based on a ‘Bottoms Up’ approach unlike the ‘Top 
Down’ approach of Discrete Event Simulation. In other words, a global structure in 
agent based simulation emerges from interactions among agents at the local level. Once 
the initial conditions are set by the modeler, agents start interacting with each other and 
the agent based model evolves over time without further outside assistance and/or 
intervention. 
3.2 Repast: Software Framework for Agent Based Simulation 
RePast is used for developing agent based model in this thesis. NetLogo, 
MASON and SWARM are some other popular platforms available for building agent 
based models and are reviewed later in this chapter. RePast is developed by the 
University of Chicago's Social Science Research Computing Department. RePast 
provides a library of objects for creating and running models, displaying graphics and 
Interactions 
WORLD 
Perception
A
gent
Goal 
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charts, and collecting output data from an agent based simulation. Agent based models 
in RePast typically contain a set of agents. Each agent is characterized with a unique 
behavior. RePast represents most of the key elements of agent-based simulation as a 
Java class or classes. These classes create a framework for building agent-based 
simulations. 
Conceptually, RePast is similar to Discrete Event Simulation Software like 
AutoMod. Events are scheduled to happen at a specific time ‘tick’. A tick is assumed to 
be quantum unit of time and is used to sequence the execution of events. RePast has a 
scheduling mechanism that is capable of creating dynamic schedules such that the 
execution of an event can itself schedule other events to be executed in the future. This 
schedule not only controls the execution of agent behaviors, but also actions within the 
model itself, such as updating the display, recording data, and so forth. Scheduling can 
be automated or manually implemented by the modeler (Collier 2000). 
RePast uses Java since it eliminates the kind of memory leaks associated with C, 
C++, and Objective-C, a particular problem for long-running simulations. Furthermore, 
Java is well documented and its cross platform design enables it to be easily installed on 
a variety of platforms. Java allows the programmer to organize his or her code into 
packages. The package system is used to partition code into logical units. Agent based 
simulation in Java is depicted in Figure 3.2 below. 
 
19 
Figure 3.2: Agent Based Simulation in Java 
 
RePast offers performance comparable to similar frameworks and will only get 
faster with the continual improvement of Java Virtual Machines. As a result of these 
goals, RePast is robust, extensible, and fairly easy to use.  
RePast framework is explained in Figure 3.3 below. RePast can be started by 
double clicking the ‘repast.jar’ file in the ‘lib’ folder. After starting, RePast displays the 
Control Tool Bar. Model library can be browsed by clicking on the ‘Folder Icon’ on tool 
bar. The selected model then can be loaded by clicking on ‘Load’. RePast then loads the 
model and Actions Tab for managing parameters is displayed. After setting the run time 
parameters, ‘Single Step’ or ‘Forward’ button can be clicked to run the model and 
‘Pause’ can be clicked to pause the model. 
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Figure 3.3: RePast Framework 
 
Typical steps involved in agent based modeling with RePast are explained in the 
Figure 3.4 below. 
 
System to be 
modeledData
Designing
Model
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Simulation 
Experiments
Results 
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Figure 3.4: Steps in Agent Based Simulation 
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An agent-based simulation modeling usually has two steps. The first step 
prepares the model for running, and the second step is the actual running of the model. 
The running of the simulation is divided into time ‘ticks’. Actions occur at every tick 
using the results of the previous tick. For example, to build an agent based model for a 
prisoner's dilemma with two players, setup would create the two players and provide 
each with an initial strategy (Co-operate, Defect, Tit-for-tat, etc.). Each tick or time step, 
players would play the game and decide to co-operate or defect depending on their 
strategy. The strategy adopted by players will in turn depend on the results of previous 
play. As a next step of building an agent based model, placeholders in the SimpleModel 
class are used to describe what happens during setup and what occurs during every tick. 
As described in the RePast tutorial, agent based simulation models in RePast 
typically have at least two classes. An agent class describes the behavior of agents e.g. 
co-operate or defect while interacting with other agents and a model class coordinates 
running the model. SimpleModel class in the RePast library can be used to inherit the 
model class. For example, class DSCM (Decentralized Supply Chain Model) is 
inherited from SimpleModel class below: 
import uchicago.src.sim.engine.*; 
public class DSCM extends SimpleModel { 
. . .
. . .
}
Please refer to the Appendix A for the entire source code. 
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While building agent based simulation models, it is important to describe the 
setup of the model, and the actions executed during every time step. ‘Setup’ and 
‘BuildModel’ methods provided by SimpleModel class can be re-described in the model 
to do the custom setup. For example: 
public void setup() { 
 super.setup(); 
 name = "Agent Based Simulation Model for Online Trading: Version # 8"; 
 grid_Side = 20; 
 prob_Loyal = 0.1;     prob_Practical = 0.1;     prob_Traitor = 0.8; 
 . . .
. . .
}
public void buildModel() { 
 agentList = new ArrayList(); 
 agentPopulation = grid_Side * grid_Side; 
 num = new int[3]; 
 num[Loyal] = (int) (agentPopulation * prob_Loyal); 
 num[Practical] = (int) (agentPopulation * prob_Practical); 
. . .
. . .
}
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‘Setup’ and ‘BuildModel’ methods are used to customize the SimpleModel 
class. ‘Super.setup’ method allows SimpleModel class to do the necessary setup on its 
own so that the player strategies can be set. Since player strategies may change from 
their default values either through user interaction or during the course of a previous 
simulation run, ‘setup’ method is used to set the model variables back to their default 
values. Setup method is called whenever the setup button is clicked or when the 
simulation is first started. 
Once the setup method resets the simulation model, ‘buildModel’ method is 
used to create the various objects that the model uses. Agents are thus created here and 
added to the agentList array, which acts a master list of agents. Per the order of 
execution in RePast, the setup method is called first followed by buildModel. 
Nonetheless as explained above, the setup method is also called whenever the setup 
button is pressed as well as when the simulation model starts running. The ‘buildModel’ 
method is called when run, step or initialize buttons are pressed thus allowing the user 
to change the parameters through the graphical user interface. 
After completing setup method, actions occurring during each time-step of the 
simulation are defined. ‘preStep, ‘step’ and ‘postStep’ are the three methods offered by 
SimpleModel class for this purpose. During each time tick, preStep is executed in the 
beginning, then step method is executed and lastly postStep is executed. The behavior of 
agents in step method is thus separated from any necessary pre- or post- processing. The 
agent based model in this research uses only step method since pre-processing or post- 
processing is not required. The example of Step method is as below: 
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public void step() { 
 interactions(); 
 StrategyDecider(); 
 Summery(); 
 }
Step method calls the ‘interactions’ method. The interactions method then 
iterates through all the agents and calls on them the ‘BusinessDealing’ method that 
facilitates the interaction between agents. The step method will be executed at each time 
step during the course of model run. 
The relationship between the various simulation control tool bar buttons and the 
execution of methods is as follows. A click on setup button executes the code in the 
setup method. Similarly, the code in buildModel method is executed after clicking the 
initialize button. The click on step button triggers execution of the code in buildModel 
method. The preStep, Step, and postStep methods are executed in that sequence after 
that. When the start button is clicked, buildModel is executed. The preStep, Step, and 
postStep sequence is executed repeatedly until the user clicks the stop or pause button. 
Model parameters are defined by accessor methods. These methods begin with 
‘get’ and ‘set’. Example of accessor methods is as below: 
public double getprob_Traitor() { 
 return prob_Traitor; 
 }
public void setprob_Traitor(double p) { 
25 
prob_Traitor = p; 
 }
In the ‘Constructor’ of the model, RePast is made aware of the parameter by 
including the parameter name in the string array of parameters called ‘params’. The 
params variable is provided by SimpleModel class. It is an array containing the names 
of the model parameters. For example: 
public void setup() { 
 super.setup(); 
 params = new String[] {"grid_Side","prob_Loyal", "prob_Practical", 
"prob_Traitor", "prob_Change", "smoothing_Const",         
"MaxSearches_PerDay"}; 
. . .
. . .
}
After creating parameter ‘accessor’ methods and populating the ‘param’ array 
with model parameter names, the parameters are displayed in the parameter pane when 
the simulation is run. These parameters are set to the values returned by their get 
accessor methods. The parameter can set by entering a new value in the parameters text 
box as shown in Figure 3.3 above. The newly entered value then becomes the argument 
to the parameter's set ‘accessor’ method. 
Agents in this thesis represent online traders. Business interactions between 
online traders are modeled as Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). Traders will have the 
26 
option of choosing any one of the IPD strategies. The strategy space includes three IPD 
strategies: 
• Loyal: To cooperate every time irrespective of the strategy adopted by the 
opponent                                              
• Practical: Tit for Tat i.e. to cooperate on the first move and then mirror 
opponent’s last move                                                        
• Traitor: To defect every time irrespective of the strategy adopted by the 
opponent 
Loyal, Practical and Traitor are also referred to as AllC (always cooperate) TFT 
(Tit for Tat) and AllD (always defect) respectively in game theory literature. Typical 
IPD payoff values of 3, 0, 5 and 1 are used and this payoff structure is strictly adhered to 
throughout the simulation. 
NetLogo, Swarm and Mason are some of the popular alternatives for RePast. 
According to Steven et al, (2006) each of these tools has certain advantages and 
drawbacks. NetLogo is very easy to use and has excellent documentation. However, 
NetLogo requires all the code to be in one file. It thus provides less organizational 
discipline as compared to Java and thus is less suitable for large size models. Also 
NetLogo does not provide access to its algorithms and thus restricts the flexibility for a 
modeler. Original Swarm developed in Objective C is a pioneer of Agent based 
platforms. It is a very stable tool and offers a fairly complete set of library classes to the 
modeler. The drawbacks of Swarm include the unpopularity of the Objective C 
language and poor availability of documentation and tutorials. Swarm is also available 
in Java, however the source code is still in Objective C and thus debugging run time 
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errors becomes very difficult. Unlike Swarm, MASON offers relatively fewer tools but 
is the fastest agent based platform and thus an ideal choice for computationally intensive 
models. MASON is however not very user friendly and is more geared toward 
experienced modelers.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand the effect of changes in the trust 
based reputation system on the cooperation levels of online traders. An online trader 
almost always makes his business decision based on trust because the current 
mechanism of customer to customer online transaction provides an added incentive for 
cheating. For example, despite receiving full payment as per the agreed price of the 
advertised product, a seller might send an inferior quality product to the buyer or still 
worse might not send anything at all. Similarly, despite receiving the satisfactory 
product a buyer might refuse to make appropriate payment to the seller. In the absence 
of any reputation system, it becomes difficult to spot such ‘Traitors’ because of the 
enormous population of online traders. Such impunity for the past misbehavior coupled 
with the abundant availability of new trading partners thus enables Traitors to thrive at 
the expense of honest and co-operative traders and eventually jeopardizes the very 
existence of electronic markets. 
It is evident that sustained cooperation among online traders is absolutely 
essential for ensuring the success of electronic markets. Thus exploring the underlying 
relationship between reputation system and cooperation level is of great practical 
significance. 
In this research, agent based simulation methodology has been used to model an 
electronic market place with 400 traders. The number of traders is limited to 400 
because the computational load of an agent based simulation model increases 
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exponentially with the number of traders. However, it was observed that the effect of 
higher numbers of traders on simulation results is statistically insignificant. 
Traders can buy as well as sell the products depending on their requirement. 
Every trader tries to find suitable business partners online and does business with them. 
Out of the total trader population of 400, 30%, i.e. 120 traders, are assumed to be 
‘Loyals’ (always co-operate), 40%, i.e. 160 traders, are assumed to be ‘Traitors’ (always 
defect) and the remaining 30% are assumed to be ‘Practical’ Traders’ (tit for tat). 
However this initial mix can quickly change once the simulation begins and traders start 
adopting the strategy that they perceive to be the most profitable one. A Trader’s payoff 
depends not only on the IPD strategy that he adopts but also on the strategy that his 
business partner uses. 
Strategies adopted by traders evolve as they start interacting with each other. As 
explained earlier in the Section 3, the strategy space available to traders comprises of 
three strategies, namely:  Loyal i.e. to cooperate every time irrespective of the strategy 
adopted by the opponent, Practical or Tit for Tat i.e. to cooperate on the first move and 
then mirror opponent’s last move and Traitor i.e. to defect every time irrespective of the 
strategy adopted by the opponent. During the course of simulation model run, traders 
can change the strategy that has been randomly assigned to them at the start of the run. 
This adaptation of agents is based on the principle of imitation i.e. agents are likely to 
imitate the strategy of the most profitable agent. Whether or not to change the strategy is 
decided solely by an agent. Every agent is assumed to be a unique individual with 
certain level of gullibility. The more gullible the agent is, the higher the probability of 
him imitating the strategy of the most profitable agent.  Thus, as the simulation run 
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progresses, agents keep reviewing their strategies and decide whether or not to imitate 
the strategy of the most successful agent resulting in evolution of different strategies. 
Traders will be able to update their strategy by imitating the strategy of the most 
profitable player with certain probability. The probability of imitation represents the 
skeptic nature of human beings. Some traders might not be willing to imitate their more 
successful counterparts because of the lack of trust. Thus it is assumed in this research 
that the trader population is more trusting if the probability of imitation is higher. For 
example, a more trusting trader would easily get influenced by the strategy adopted by 
the profitable traders and might end up imitating their strategy. On the contrary, a less 
trusting trader would typically be more skeptical. This level of skepticism, which is 
unique to each individual trader, is captured by a randomly assigned ‘Probability of 
Imitation’.  
During the course of the simulation, traders try to buy or sell the products by 
making a business proposition to the online traders who they think are appropriate. The 
trader, who successfully searches a business prospect online and makes a business 
proposal, would need a high Track Record Score to make sure that the deal materializes. 
His business proposal is likely to get rejected by the prospective business partner if he 
has a lower Track Record Score raising serious concern about his trustworthiness. 
As explained in the previous section, Track Record Score (TRS) is used as a 
reputation based system designed to make sure that Traitors would have to pay dearly in 
terms of their reduced market reputation. TRS enables honest traders to build their 
market reputation by co-operating with other online traders and honoring the contractual 
terms. Such a trader would be able to earn a very high Track Record Score. Traders 
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would obviously prefer to deal with only those traders who they feel are trustworthy. An 
excellent Track Record Score will enable traders to win the confidence of other 
cooperating traders. 
Each trader is allowed to decide his own strategy. He can either improve his 
TRS by cooperating or choose to earn more short term profit by defecting and thus 
sacrificing his TRS. It is worth taking note that TRS does NOT alter the Payoff Matrix. 
However, it does affect the chances of a trader getting accepted by other traders for an 
online trade. Thus traders who choose to defect for the short term gains will have to do 
so at the cost of their own market reputation i.e. Track Record Score. Each trader will 
receive an initial TRS of 100. Upon the conclusion of a deal between two agents, their 
scores are updated. The mechanism for updating scores is as follows: 
Case 1: None of the agent adopted ‘Always Defect’ 
 
- Both the agents get 100 points each 
 
Case 2: At least one of the agents adopt ‘Always Defect’ 
- Agent gets 100  points if he adopts ‘Always Co-operate’ 
- Agent gets  0   points if he has adopted ‘Tit for Tat’ 
- Agent gets –100 points if he has adopted ‘Always Defect’ 
This Track Record Score is conceptually similar to the Feed Back Score system 
implemented by eBay. However, unlike this Track Record Score system, eBay does not 
use exponential smoothing for scaling feedback scores. Furthermore, although eBay 
investigates complaints of misbehavior and prevents monitory losses of honest and co-
operative traders, it does not make any effort to cancel the reduction in the feedback 
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score caused by dishonest feedback. The Track Record Score system assumes 
investigations are undertaken immediately to nullify the effect of imperfect reporting of 
the trader’s behavior on the Track Record Score. In other words, the possibility of 
imperfect reporting is not considered in this research. 
Following mathematical equation is used for scaling track record scores using 
exponential smoothing: 
New Track Record Score = A * Old Score + (1- A) * Current Score 
- Where A is a smoothing constant 
For example: 
If the Smoothing Constant is 0.8 then: 
New Track Record Score  =   0.8 * Old Score  +  (1 - 0.8) * Current Score 
Thus the higher Smoothing constant signifies that more importance is given to 
the old score of an agent.  
The probability of two agents agreeing to do business with each other is 
weighted equally on ‘minimum of the two agents’ scores’ &    ‘Difference between 
Agents’ scores’. For example, if the track record scores of agents X and Y are 40 and 70 
respectively, then the probability that X and Y will agree to do business with each other 
is: 
0.5/100 *  [  40         +        (100- (70-40)) ] 
 
While calculating the probability of two agents agreeing to trade with each other, 
a 50% weight is given to the ‘minimum of the two agents’ scores’ because it is assumed 
Directly proportional to 
minimum Track Record Score 
Inversely proportional to difference 
between Track Record Scores 
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that the trader with the lower track record score is likely to get rejected by the trader 
with the higher track record score. Similarly the rest of the 50% weight is given to the 
“difference between agents’ scores” because it is assumed that two agents would 
probably agree to trade with each other if the difference in their Track Record Scores is 
not high. If one of the traders has a substantially higher Track Record Score then he 
would not be interested in a trade proposal from his counterpart. It is assumed that a 
trader with a higher Track Record Score would always want to deal with traders who 
have equal or higher scores than him. On a similar note, two traders, each with low track 
record scores, are likely to trade with each other since they won’t probably be accepted 
by traders with higher track record scores anyway. 
Although it is assumed in this research that a trader with a high Track Record 
Score is more likely to reject a business proposal from a trader with a low Track Record 
Score, one could argue that a trader with a lower Track Record Score can lure the more 
reputable traders by offering attractive prices. However, in order to maintain the 
applicability of Prisoner’s Dilemma to this research, it is assumed that traders will not 
change the price structure. 
Upon completion of the trading between two agents, an agent’s payoff will be 
added to the cumulative market profit if the player has cooperated. If the player has 
defected then his payoff will be deducted from cumulative market profit. Mean Trader 
Profit will be thus calculated using the following equation: 
 
Mean Trader Profit = (Cumulative Market Profit) / (Trader Population) 
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A higher Mean Trader Profit indicates that traders are co-operating with each 
other since the IPD payoff structure is used to model agent interactions. Mean Trader 
profit will be used as a Performance Metric for simulation experiments since the main 
objective of this research is to understand the effect of changes in the trust based 
reputation system on the cooperation levels of online traders. 
The flow chart of the agent based model discussed above is depicted in the 
Figure 4.1 below: 
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Figure 4.1: Agent Based Simulation Model Flow Chart 
 
As per the first step in the Figure 4.1 above, the Mean Trader Profit was selected 
as the performance metric. Smoothing Constant and Probability of Imitation were 
selected as the key system variables. 
As a next step, agents were created in the model by employing the ‘buildModel’ 
method recommended by the standard RePast procedure described in Chapter 3 above. 
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All the agents were given a random strategy at the beginning of the model. Once the 
simulation run begins, using ‘interactions’ method, agents search for their appropriate 
partner and make a business proposal. However, whether or not the two agents interact 
would depend on their Track Record Scores. As explained earlier in this section, the 
probability of the agents interacting would be directly proportional to the minimum of 
the Track Record Scores of two agents and inversely proportional to difference between 
their Track Record Scores. 
Agents use the ‘beginDealing’ method to interact with their business partners. 
During interaction, each agent employs his or her premeditated strategy and chooses to 
either co-operate or defect. The defection would result in lowering their TRS and 
cooperation would result in increasing their TRS as explained earlier in this section. The 
impact of agent behavior on TRS depends on the ‘Smoothing Constant’ parameter. The 
‘profitSum’ method keeps track of the profit or loss made by agents during these 
interactions. Since the standard Iterated Prisonner’s Dilemma (IPD) payoff structure 
used in this thesis, agents would make a profit only when neither of the agents uses the 
‘Defection’ strategy. The payoff structure is explained in the Table 2.2. 
After the start of agent interactions, the ‘StrategyDecider’ method provides all 
the agents with an opportunity to imitate the strategy that they perceive to be the most 
profitable one. Whether or not the agents would imitate the strategy of the most 
profitable player would depend on the parameter ‘Probability of Imitation’. 
Figure 4.2 below depicts the effect of key system variables ‘Smoothing 
Constant’ and ‘Probability of Imitation’ on the performance metric ‘Mean Trader 
Profit’. It can be seen in Figure 4.2 that cooperation can be sustained when the 
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smoothing constant is set to 0.8 ( i.e. 80% weightage is given to the past behavior of 
agents while calculating Track Record Score) and probability of imitation is set to 0.4 ( 
i.e. the probability of agents imitating the strategy of other successful agents is 40%). 
Since agents are somewhat skeptical in this case they did not copy the Traitors during 
the initial periods when Traitors were making more profit. Eventually the Traitors 
started losing since their Track Record Scores reduced substantially and agents with 
higher Track Record Score refused to do business with them. Cooperation thus is 
sustained in the agent population resulting in the approximate Mean Trader Profit of 3. 
 
Figure 4.2: Snapshot of Simulation Model with Probability of Imitation = 0.4 
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Figure 4.3 below depicts the effect of having more gullible agents in the population i.e. 
increasing probability of imitation without changing smoothing constant. Since agents 
are more gullible they are more likely to imitate Traitors during initial periods when 
Traitors are making more profit at the cost of their Track Record Scores. This triggers 
the frenzy among agents and soon Traitors start proliferating. The vicious circle 
eventually results in wiping out the remaining cooperation and thus resulting in 
approximate Mean Trader Profit of -1. 
 
Figure 4.3: Snapshot of Simulation Model with Probability of Imitation = 0.8 
 
It is clear from Figure 4.3 above that high values of the Smoothing Constant result in 
zero cooperation among agent population characterized by high level of gullibility. One 
of the solutions to this problem could be to reduce the value of the Smoothing Constant. 
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This will ensure that the current behavior of agents gets more weightage than the past 
behavior thus bringing down Track Record Scores of traitors relatively quickly. Traitors 
will thus find it difficult to feed on gullible co-operators since agents with higher Track 
Record Scores are more likely to refuse the business proposal from agents with lower 
Track Record Scores. This will prevent the snowball effect of traitor proliferation 
initially and allow co-operators to earn enough profit not only to survive but also to 
prosper. Cooperation thus gets sustained as a depicted by Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: Snapshot of Simulation Model with Smoothing Constant = 0.4 
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It is critically important for a system designer to test the effect of different 
factors on the level of cooperation among agents. Agent based methodology can be 
effectively used for such analysis.  
Although the trust based system is meant to penalize agents for their dishonest 
behavior, it would be unjust to punish an agent forever even if he is willing to behave 
responsibly. It would be tantamount to refusing rehabilitation opportunities to the 
former criminals. The obvious question that follows is how much weightage should be 
given to the past as well as recent behavior of the agents while calculating their Track 
Record Score. Unfortunately, it is impossible to find an elixir to such a problem, simply 
because each solution is going to be population specific. As the population mix changes, 
the solution will have to be reviewed too. For example, the trust based system designed 
for the predominantly skeptic agent population will not prove to be an ideal solution for 
the population filled with mostly gullible agents. 
This thesis thus attempts to analyze changes in the level of cooperation as 
weightage given to the past behavior of agents (i.e. ‘Smoothing Constant) is gradually 
reduced and more weightage is given to their current behavior. This analysis is done for 
a variety of population mixes; ranging from the one that is predominantly skeptic (i.e. 
‘Probability of Imitation = 0.2) to the one that is mostly gullible (i.e. ‘Probability of 
Imitation = 0.95). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS 
 
The main objective of the agent based model in this research is to analyze the 
factors that influence the co-operative behavior of agents. As a first step, the model was 
run without the Tract Record Score system and validated using the results of the 
previous research. Per Axelrod et al, 1998, when imitation is used as an adaptive 
process, cooperation can be sustained with Tit For Tat strategy outshining Always 
Defect as the most popular strategy, if players interact with only with their von 
Neumann neighbors and the neighbors are not changed during the course of simulation 
run. In other words, agents will be able to choose the strategy but not the neighbors with 
whom they will be interacting. Furthermore Axelrod et al (1998) state that cooperation 
can not be sustained if players are allowed to interact randomly with each other.  Similar 
results were observed when the base model without Track Record System was run under 
the two conditions mentioned above. It can be seen in Figure, 5.1 that Tit for Tat 
emerges as the most successful strategy when agents interact only with their neighbors.  
Figure 5.2 indicates that Always Defect emerges as the winner if agents are allowed to 
interact randomly with each other. 
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Figure 5.1: Agents Interact Only With the Neighbors 
 
Figure 5.2: Agents Interact Randomly with Each Other 
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As a next step, Track Record Score was introduced in this research to establish a 
reputation system capable of promoting cooperation among agents with different levels 
of gullibility. The next obvious step is to design the ‘what-if’ scenarios. Designing the 
‘what-if’ scenarios is one of the most important steps in the agent based simulation 
modeling methodology. Hence the ‘Smoothing Constant’ (i.e. weightage given to the 
past behavior of agents) and ‘Probability of Imitation’ (i.e. level of gullibility of agents) 
were identified as the critical factors for designing the what-if scenarios. ‘Percentage of 
honest traders in the population mix’ and ‘payoff structure for agents’ were also 
identified as the probable factors for what-if scenarios. However, it was observed that 
their impact on the level of cooperation is statistically insignificant as discussed later in 
this chapter. 
As stated earlier, the Track Record Score depends on the current behavior of an 
agent and how the agent has behaved in the past. The following equation is used to 
calculate the Track Record Score (TRS). 
New Track Record Score = A * Old Score + (1- A) * Current Score 
- Where A is a smoothing constant 
Thus it is evident that any change in the value of the smoothing constant is 
bound to affect the Track Record Score and in turn the level of cooperation among 
agents. Agents in this model can imitate the strategy of other agents who they perceive 
to be more successful. The more gullible an agent is the higher the probability is that he 
would be influenced by the strategy of the seemingly more successful agents. On the 
contrary, driven by inherent mistrust, a skeptic agent would be more apprehensive in 
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imitating the strategies of other agents. Thus the level of gullibility of agents would also 
be an important factor that can influence the level of cooperation among agents. 
Needless to mention, the agent based simulation model developed in this 
research can be used as a tool to answer a few basic questions in the mind of a system 
designer tasked to improve the Trust Based Reputation System for achieving higher 
cooperation levels among online traders. Some of those questions could be, how would 
the change in the gullibility levels of traders affect the cooperation levels? For the given 
gullibility level of a trader population, exactly how much emphasis should be given on 
the past behavior of agents while calculating the Track Record Score? At what point 
would the right answer not be right any more? In other words, for the given trader 
population, what are those critical points where any further change in the gullibility 
levels and/or change in the emphasis given on the past performance of agents while 
calculating Track Record Score would result in proliferation of traitors? The what-if 
scenarios designed in this research are aimed at answering exactly these questions. 
Lack of in-depth statistical analysis often results into unreliable simulation 
results. Per Axelrod (Axelrod, 1997), the analysis of a single run can be misleading. In 
order to determine whether the conclusions from a given run are typical it is necessary 
to do several simulation runs using identical parameters (using different random number 
seeds). While it may be sufficient to describe detailed history from a single run, it is also 
necessary to do statistical analysis of a whole set of runs to determine whether the 
inferences drawn from the illustrative history are really well founded. The ability to do 
this is one major advantage of simulation: the researcher can rerun history to see 
whether the particular patterns observed in a single run are idiosyncratic or typical. 
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The Mean Trader Profit is calculated by making 6 replications of each of the 9 
experiments fed with antithetic variates of random seeds to minimize the variance. So 
the total number of replications carried out is 54. Since all the experiments are of 
terminating type a warm up period is not required. Run length of 100 is chosen because 
all the experiments hit the steady state well before that.  
Table 5.1 below summarizes results for the different what-if scenarios: 
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Table 5.1: Summary of What-if Scenarios 
 
* C.I. : Confidence Interval 
1. Probability of Change =  0.60    
Smoothing Constant   =  0.90 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  -0.969 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.02 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (-0.952,, -0.985)   
 
2. Probability of Change =  0.40    
Smoothing Constant   =  0.90 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.381    
Standard Deviation      =  0.30 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.621, 2.141) 
 
3. Probability of Change =  0.20    
Smoothing Constant   =  0.90 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.690 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.10 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.768, 2.612) 
 
4. Probability of Change =  0.95   
Smoothing Constant   =  0.70 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  -0.977 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.02 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (-0.966, -0.989) 
5. Probability of Change =  0.70    
Smoothing Constant   =  0. 70 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.839 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.04 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.871, 2.807) 
 
6. Probability of Change =  0.40    
Smoothing Constant   =  0. 70 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.818 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.05 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.859, 2.778) 
 
7. Probability of Change =  0.95    
Smoothing Constant   =  0.40 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.840 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.07 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.899, 2.781) 
8. Probability of Change =  0.7    
Smoothing Constant   =  0. 40 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.891 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.04 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.926, 2.856) 
 
9. Probability of Change =  0.40    
Smoothing Constant   =  0. 40 
 Mean Trader’s Profit    =  2.924 
 Standard Deviation      =  0.03 
 95% C. I. for Mean    =  (2.947, 2.901) 
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It is evident from the simulation results that the weightage given to the past 
behavior of traders while calculating TRS influences the cooperation level within the 
trader community. Furthermore, the influence increases with the increase in the level of 
gullibility of traders. A simple approach like completely condoning the past misbehavior 
of agents or not condoning it at all unfortunately would not help in sustaining 
cooperation among traders. It is likely that the agents that have misbehaved i.e. not 
cooperated in the past, could refuse to show any repentance and continue to misbehave 
in future. Thus condoning the past misbehavior is tantamount to providing incomplete 
information about some of the potential traitors. On the contrary not condoning the past 
behavior at all would most certainly de-motivate the traders that are willing to make 
amends for the past misbehavior and ready to cooperate in future. Agents who have 
misbehaved in the past can be encouraged to cooperate if their past mistakes are given 
less weightage while calculating TRS. Thus it is critically important to fine tune the 
weightage given to the past behavior of agents by taking into account the level of 
gullibility of agents. An agent based model can be effectively used to analyze this issue. 
An agent based model can predict the limit to which the weightage given to the past 
behavior of traders can be safely increased without compromising on cooperation levels. 
The careful analysis of the simulation results reveals the correlation between the 
Smoothing Constant (i.e. weightage given to the past behavior of an agent) and the 
Probability of Imitation (i.e. level of gullibility of traders). The maximum permissible 
probability of imitation to maintain full cooperation decreases with the increase in the 
smoothing constant. In other words, as weightage given to the old TRS is gradually 
increased, sustaining cooperation becomes increasingly difficult if the population is very 
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trusting. This is quite intuitive since giving higher weightage to the old TRS would 
result in making defection an attractive strategy for the traders. Furthermore, such 
dishonest traders would be able to quickly proliferate since the agent population is very 
trusting. 
Probability of imitation i.e. level of gullibility of agents also affects mean trader 
profit. Mean trader profit decreases as the agent population becomes more and more 
trusting. In other words, the nuisance value of dishonest traders increases substantially 
as agents become more trusting. The extent to which the mean trader profit gets affected 
depends on the value of the smoothing constant. The higher the smoothing constant, the 
greater is the impact of level of gullibility on mean trader profit. Since the population 
mix is always going to be dynamic, it is important for a system designer to be able to 
predict the change in the mean trader profit for a particular population mix as the 
weightage given to the past behavior of agents is changed. This would enable him to 
fine tune the smoothing constant and increase the mean trader profit. So the agent based 
model would be used to calculate the change in the mean trader profit caused by a 
change in the level of gullibility of agents at different levels of smoothing constants. 
A Smoothing Constant of 0.9 signifies that very high weightage is given to the 
old TRS. Figure 5.3 depicts the effect of a change in probability of imitation on mean 
trader profit for smoothing constant = 0.9. For this value of the smoothing constant, the 
mean trader profit decreases with the increase in the level of gullibility of agents. In fact, 
as the percentage of gullible agents in the population approaches 60%, the mean trader 
profit becomes -1 indicating that agents have stopped cooperating. This is an important 
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observation. For a particular population mix, it helps the system designer to understand 
the range of smoothing constants with in which the cooperation can be sustained. 
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Figure 5.3: Effect of Change in Probability of Imitation on Mean Trader 
Profit for Smoothing Constant = 0.9 
 
Figure 5.4 depicts the effect of a change in the probability of imitation on mean 
trader profit for a smoothing constant = 0.7. The reduction in Smoothing Constant from 
0.9 to 0.7 signifies that weightage given to the old TRS is reduced. The mean trader 
profit becomes -1 when the probability of imitation approaches 95%. It is worth noting 
that the maximum permissible probability of imitation to avoid negative mean trader 
profit increases with the reduction in the smoothing constant.  
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Figure 5.4: Effect of Change in Probability of Imitation on Mean Trader Profit for 
Smoothing Constant = 0.7 
 
Figure 5.5 depicts the effect of a change in the probability of imitation on mean 
trader profit for a smoothing constant = 0.4. The further reduction in Smoothing 
Constant from 0.7 to 0.4 signifies that lesser weightage is given to the old TRS. As seen 
in the previous scenarios, Mean Trader Profit decreases with an increase in the 
probability of imitation i.e. as the traders become more and more trusting. 
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Figure 5.5 Effect of Change in Probability of Imitation on Mean Trader Profit for 
Smoothing Constant = 0.4 
 
If the population mix (i.e. level of gullibility of traders) is known then the 
simulation model can be used to predict the mean trader profit at different levels of 
smoothing constants. Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 depict the effect of a change in smoothing 
constant on mean trader profit for different values of the probability of imitation. It can 
be seen that mean trader profit decreases as the smoothing constant is increased 
gradually, i.e. more weightage is given to the past behavior of agents. In other words, if 
excessive weightage is given to the past behavior of an agent then some of the agents 
with good track record scores might decide to defect and earn more profit without 
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affecting their track record score much since their past behavior was exemplary. Soon 
other agents will start imitating these traitors and thus mean trader profit will reduce. 
Furthermore, the drop in the mean trader profit is substantial for the agent population 
with high levels of gullibility simply because higher levels of gullibility allows traitors 
to proliferate very quickly. 
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Figure 5.6 Effect of Change in Smoothing Constant on Mean Trader Profit for 
Probability of Imitation = 0.95 
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Figure 5.7 Effect of Change in Smoothing Constant on Mean Trader Profit for 
Probability of Imitation = 0.7 
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Figure 5.8 Effect of Change in Smoothing Constant on Mean Trader Profit for 
Probability of Imitation = 0.4 
 
It is also necessary to test the sensitivity of the results for changes in the values 
of ‘percentage of dishonest traders in the initial population mix’ and ‘payoff structure 
for agents’. To test this, the regular payoff structure is doubled ensuring that the 
fundamental T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S > 2P conditions as explained in the previous 
chapter are satisfied. The new payoff structure is explained in Table 5.2 below: 
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Table 5.2: Payoff Matrix for the Row Player 
 
Column Player 
Cooperate(C) Defect(D)
Cooperate(C) R ( 6 ) S ( 0 )Row  
Player
Defect(D) T ( 10 ) P ( 2 ) 
Also the percentage of dishonest traders in the initial population mix was also 
doubled from 40% to 80%. As expected, the results did not change except for the fact 
that the Mean Trader Profit was doubled because of the changed payoff structure. This 
is intuitive since the percentage of the dishonest traders in the initial population mix will 
not affect the results as long as cooperation emerges as the most profit making strategy 
and thus is likely to get adopted by other agents.    
 
Analysis of the results above indicates that the trust based reputation systems 
like Track Record Score used in this research, could be effectively used to sustain the 
cooperation among online traders. However, every trader population is characterized by 
the unique level of gullibility of its traders. Furthermore, this level of gullibly of traders 
could change over time. The failure to factor in the level of gullibility of traders while 
designing the trust based reputation system may result in rendering the reputation 
system ineffective. In other words, there is no elixir for eliminating defection in the 
given trader population. 
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The system designer has to carefully study the population mix and then run the 
various what-if scenarios of an agent based simulation model gradually increasing the 
smoothing constant, i.e. the weight of influence attached to the past behavior of agents. 
This would enable the system designer to estimate the maximum permissible value of 
smoothing constant that can sustain the cooperation for the given population mix, 
although further fine tuning might be necessary after studying the dynamics of the 
population mix. 
As a last step, the system designer would have to test the robustness of the 
Reputation System design. It is important not only to find the ‘right answer’ but also the 
details about when the answer isn’t right any more. Sensitivity analysis on the important 
parameters like level of gullibility of agents would thus be required to ensure the 
robustness of the reputation system design.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
According to game theory, a dominant strategy for online trading modeled as 
Prisoner’s dilemma game is defecting (Epstein, 1997). However, the Track Record 
Score reputation system designed by taking into account the level of gullibility of online 
traders is capable of sustaining cooperation among online traders. 
It is essential to take into account past behavior of a trader while calculating his 
current Track Record Score because it serves as a deterrent for agents that are tempted 
to defect and earn larger short term profit. However, the weightage given to the past 
behavior should be decided after taking into account the level of gullibility of agents. It 
is observed that the cooperation would be difficult to sustain among relatively trusting 
online traders at higher values of the Smoothing Constant, i.e. if higher weightage is 
given to the past behavior of a trader. It is also observed that for a given value of the 
Smoothing Constant, the Mean Trader Profit decreases with an increase in gullibility of 
traders. This is exactly what happens in the real life online trading where dishonest 
traders feed on the relatively naïve and gullible traders who can be easily cheated. 
The results presented in this thesis can be extended in several different ways. 
One of the several extensions could be to modify the reputation system in this research 
and include domain specific reputations. Domain specific reputation usually depends on 
quality of after-sales service in addition to the honest behavior of an online trader. For 
example, Amazon has a better reputation in the realm of books where as Wal-Mart has 
better reputation in the area of consumer electronics. Although both are considered 
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trustworthy traders, the buyers would still make their purchases by taking into account 
their domain specific reputations. In fact domain specific reputation can be considered 
as one of the reasons to explain unsuccessful attempts of Wal-Mart to replace 
Amazon.com as the most popular site for buying books online. 
Another extension could be to give more importance to the feedback from agents 
that have higher Track Record Score. In other words, importance given to an Agent’s 
feedback would be directly proportional to his/her Track Record Score. This would help 
honest traders to punish the dishonest traders even harder by quickly bringing down 
their Track Record Score and help honest traders to build their reputation sooner. The 
Track Record Score could be considered as the single most effective weapon against 
dishonest online traders and thus helping honest traders to build their reputation quicker 
would certainly shield them from being preyed upon by their dishonest counterparts. 
This research assumes that all agents report the feedback meticulously. This 
unfortunately is not always true because many agents do not see any incentive in 
providing feedback. This in turn weakens the reputation system since many dishonest 
traders would be able to get away with their bad behavior simply because their business 
partners just did not report their misbehavior. Furthermore, the honest traders would 
find it difficult to build the Track Record Score because of less than 100% feedback 
reporting. It would thus be important to see the effects of imperfect reporting on the 
overall cooperation levels. 
As a counter strategy to prevent imperfect reporting, incentives could be 
awarded to the agents that ensure 100% feedback reporting. For example, 
www.emove.com, refunds the transaction fee of $5.95 to their customers upon their 
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feedback reporting. Such monetary incentives serve as a source of motivation for the 
people who otherwise would not have provided a feedback. In the moving business, the 
reputation of the movers matters the most to the customers. Having more reviews helps 
‘emove.com’ to attract more customers to their website. Furthermore, the movers also 
provide the best service to ensure positive feedback because presence of even a single 
negative feedback can turn potential customers away from them. This is an excellent 
example that underscores the importance of feedback reporting. Furthermore, it also 
leads us to one more interesting possibility that is worth considering. A group of agents 
might decide to do fake transactions and provide excellent feedbacks to each other in 
order to increase their feedback scores. The reputation system should have enough 
checks and balances in place to avoid such cases from happening. 
One more possibility is that some of the honest traders might be complacent. 
After collecting a certain amount of wealth, they might just decide to quit the business. 
Such complacent traders might make it harder to sustain the cooperation levels. 
Similarly, the traders with the low Track Record Scores might decide to quit and re-
enter with a different identities to hide their dishonest behavior in the past. The research 
could be extended to quantify the effect of such agent behavior. 
The cost of searching for suitable business partners could also be introduced in 
this agent based model. This research assumes that the agents do not incur any cost for 
searching for the appropriate partner. However, time is a critical resource so it is only 
logical to introduce the cost of searching for suitable business partners and ensure that 
the conservative agents spending more time to search for business partners would have 
to pay some price for their slow response time. This would create a level playing field 
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for the risk seeking online traders in the model who choose their business partners 
relatively quickly. 
The agent strategies used in this research are Always Co-operate, Always Defect 
and Tit for Tat. However, the strategy space could be further expanded to include 
Pavlov, Mistrust (defects on the first move and then mirrors opponent’s move there on), 
Spiteful (co-operates until first opponent’s defection and then always defects) and other 
popular strategies used in the agent based literature. 
The use of agent based modeling for studying dynamics of online trading is a 
relatively new concept. Sustaining cooperation among online traders is often perceived 
to be a difficult task. The Track Record Score concept used in this research is expected 
to make contribution towards this goal. 
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APPENDIX 
 
JAVA SOURCE CODE FOR THE AGENT BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
 
package shriganesha.dscm.Decentralized_Supply_Chain_Model; 
 
import uchicago.src.sim.space.*; 
import uchicago.src.sim.engine.*; 
import uchicago.src.sim.util.SimUtilities; 
import java.util.*; 
import java.lang.Math; 
 
public class DSCM extends SimpleModel { 
 
public ArrayList agentList; 
 ArrayList agentListN; 
 ArrayList agentListS; 
 ArrayList agentListE; 
 ArrayList agentListW; 
 
Object2DTorus Region_W; 
 Object2DTorus Region_E; 
 Object2DTorus Region_S; 
 Object2DTorus Region_N; 
 
public double cumulSCprofit; 
 public int totalnumplays; 
 
final int Loyal = 0; 
 final int Practical = 1; 
 final int Traitor = 2; 
 final int strategyTypes = 3; 
 
int grid_Side; 
 int agentPopulation; 
 double prob_Loyal, prob_Practical, prob_Traitor; 
 int num[]; 
 int numDealings; 
 int locals; 
 double prob_Change; 
 int Searches_PerDay; 
 int MaxSearches_PerDay; 
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double smoothing_Const = 0.4; 
 
public DSCM(){ 
 name = "Agent Based Simulation Model of Online Trading: Version # 8"; 
 }
public void setup() { 
 super.setup(); 
 name = "Agent Based Simulation Model of Online Trading: Version # 8"; 
 grid_Side = 20; 
 
prob_Loyal = 0.3; 
 prob_Practical = 0.3; 
 prob_Traitor = 0.4; 
 numDealings = 2; 
 
locals = 4; 
 prob_Change = 0.4; 
 Searches_PerDay = 5; 
 MaxSearches_PerDay = 5; 
 }
public void buildModel() { 
 
agentList = new ArrayList(); 
 agentListN = new ArrayList(); 
 agentListS = new ArrayList(); 
 agentListE = new ArrayList(); 
 agentListW = new ArrayList(); 
 
Region_W = new Object2DTorus(grid_Side/2, grid_Side/2); 
 Region_N = new Object2DTorus(grid_Side/2, grid_Side/2); 
 Region_S = new Object2DTorus(grid_Side/2, grid_Side/2); 
 Region_E = new Object2DTorus(grid_Side/2, grid_Side/2); 
 
agentPopulation = grid_Side * grid_Side; 
 num = new int[3]; 
 num[Loyal] = (int) (agentPopulation * prob_Loyal); 
 num[Practical] = (int) (agentPopulation * prob_Practical); 
 num[Traitor] = (int) (agentPopulation * prob_Traitor); 
 
if (num[Traitor] != agentPopulation - num[Loyal] - num[Practical] ) 
 num[Traitor] = agentPopulation - num[Loyal] - num[Practical] ; 
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double TRS = 100; 
 int Status = 1; 
 int Category; 
 int playerID = 0; 
 cumulSCprofit = 0; 
 totalnumplays = 0; 
 
for (int playerType = 0; playerType < strategyTypes; playerType++){ 
 for (int i = 0; i<(num[playerType])/8; i++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 1,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListN.add(agent); 
 }
for (int i = 0; i<(num[playerType])/8; i++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 2,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListN.add(agent); 
 }
for (int j = 0; j<(num[playerType])/8; j++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 1,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListS.add(agent); 
 }
for (int j = 0; j<(num[playerType])/8; j++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 2,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListS.add(agent); 
 }
for (int i = 0; i<(num[playerType])/8; i++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 1,  playerType, this); 
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agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListE.add(agent); 
 }
for (int i = 0; i<(num[playerType])/8; i++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 2,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListE.add(agent); 
 }
for (int i = 0; i<(num[playerType])/8; i++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 1,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListW.add(agent); 
 }
for (int i = 0; i<(num[playerType])/8; i++) { 
 playerID++; 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = new SupplyChainAgent(playerID, TRS, Status, 
Category = 2,  playerType, this); 
 agentList.add(agent); 
 agentListW.add(agent); 
 }
}
SimUtilities.shuffle(agentList); 
 SimUtilities.shuffle(agentListN); 
 SimUtilities.shuffle(agentListS); 
 SimUtilities.shuffle(agentListW); 
 SimUtilities.shuffle(agentListE); 
 
for (int x = 0;  x < grid_Side/2; x++){ 
 for (int y = 0; y < grid_Side/2; y++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListN.get(x*grid_Side/2+y); 
 Region_N.putObjectAt(x, y, agent); 
 agent.placeTo(x, y); 
 }
}
for (int x = 0;  x < grid_Side/2; x++){ 
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for (int y = 0; y < grid_Side/2; y++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListS.get(x*grid_Side/2+y); 
 Region_S.putObjectAt(x, y, agent); 
 agent.placeTo(x, y); 
 }
}
for (int x = 0;  x < grid_Side/2; x++){ 
 for (int y = 0; y < grid_Side/2; y++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListE.get(x*grid_Side/2+y); 
 Region_E.putObjectAt(x, y, agent); 
 agent.placeTo(x, y); 
 }
}
for (int x = 0;  x < grid_Side/2; x++){ 
 for (int y = 0; y < grid_Side/2; y++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListW.get(x*grid_Side/2+y); 
 Region_W.putObjectAt(x, y, agent); 
 agent.placeTo(x, y); 
 }
}
Summery(); 
 }
public void BusinessDealing(SupplyChainAgent rowPlayer, SupplyChainAgent 
colPlayer) { 
 
rowPlayer.BusinessPartner = colPlayer; 
 rowPlayer.pastBusinessPartners.add(colPlayer); 
 colPlayer.BusinessPartner = rowPlayer; 
 colPlayer.pastBusinessPartners.add(rowPlayer); 
 
if ( rowPlayer.type <= 1 &&  colPlayer.type <= 1 ) { 
 rowPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(rowPlayer.TRS) + (1-
smoothing_Const)*(100)); 
 colPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(colPlayer.TRS) + (1-
smoothing_Const)*(100)); 
 
}
if ( rowPlayer.type == 2  ||  colPlayer.type == 2 ) { 
 if  (rowPlayer.type == 0)  rowPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(rowPlayer.TRS) + 
(1-smoothing_Const)*(100)); 
66 
if  (rowPlayer.type == 1)  rowPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(rowPlayer.TRS) + 
(1-smoothing_Const)*(0)); 
 if  (rowPlayer.type == 2)  rowPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(rowPlayer.TRS) - 
(1-smoothing_Const)*(100)); 
 if  (colPlayer.type == 0)  colPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(colPlayer.TRS) + (1-
smoothing_Const)*(100)); 
 if  (colPlayer.type == 1)  colPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(colPlayer.TRS) + (1-
smoothing_Const)*(0)); 
 if  (colPlayer.type == 2)  colPlayer.TRS =  (smoothing_Const*(colPlayer.TRS) - (1-
smoothing_Const)*(100)); 
 }
for (int i=1; i<=numDealings; i++) { 
 totalnumplays = totalnumplays + 1; 
 rowPlayer.beginDealing(i); 
 colPlayer.beginDealing(i); 
 rowPlayer.remember(); 
 colPlayer.remember(); 
 rowPlayer.profitSum(); 
 colPlayer.profitSum(); 
 }
}
public void statuscheck() { 
 for (int i=0; i < agentPopulation; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentList.get(i); 
 agent.status(); 
 }
}
public void interactions() { 
 for (int i=0; i < agentPopulation; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentList.get(i); 
 
for (int j=0; j<MaxSearches_PerDay; j++){ 
 int randomNumber; 
 SupplyChainAgent BusinessPartner; 
 do { 
 randomNumber = getNextIntFromTo (0, agentPopulation-1); 
 
BusinessPartner = (SupplyChainAgent) agentList.get(randomNumber); 
 } while (BusinessPartner.playerID == agent.playerID); 
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if ((100* (getNextDoubleFromTo(0.0,1.0))) <  ( 
((Math.max(Math.min(agent.TRS, BusinessPartner.TRS ), 0))) +    (100 - 
(Math.max(agent.TRS, BusinessPartner.TRS ) - 
Math.max(Math.min(agent.TRS, BusinessPartner.TRS ), 0)  ))  )/2) 
 
BusinessDealing(agent, BusinessPartner); 
 }
}
}
public void StrategyDecider() { 
 
for (int i=0; i<agentPopulation; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent)agentList.get(i); 
 agent.strategyDeciding(); 
 }
for (int i=0; i<agentPopulation; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent)agentList.get(i); 
 agent.updateType(); 
 }
}
public void Summery() { 
 
for (int i=Loyal; i<strategyTypes; i++) 
 num[i] = 0;{ 
 
for (int i=0; i<agentPopulation/4; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListN.get(i); 
 num[agent.type]++; 
 }
for (int i=0; i<agentPopulation/4; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListS.get(i); 
 num[agent.type]++; 
 }
for (int i=0; i<agentPopulation/4; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListW.get(i); 
 num[agent.type]++; 
 }
for (int i=0; i<agentPopulation/4; i++) { 
 SupplyChainAgent agent = (SupplyChainAgent) agentListE.get(i); 
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num[agent.type]++; 
 }
}
}
public void step() { 
 interactions(); 
 StrategyDecider(); 
 Summery(); 
 }
public static void main(String[] args) { 
 SimInit init = new SimInit(); 
 DSCM m = new DSCM(); 
 init.loadModel(m, null, false); 
 }
}
package shriganesha.dscm.Decentralized_Supply_Chain_Model; 
 
import uchicago.src.sim.gui.*; 
import uchicago.src.sim.engine.*; 
import uchicago.src.sim.analysis.*; 
import java.awt.Color; 
 
public class DSCMGraphics extends DSCM { 
 
public OpenSequenceGraph graph; 
 public OpenSequenceGraph graph1; 
 
public DisplaySurface dsurfN; 
 public DisplaySurface dsurfS; 
 public DisplaySurface dsurfE; 
 public DisplaySurface dsurfW; 
 
public DSCMGraphics() { 
 Controller.ALPHA_ORDER = false; 
 }
class SeqCumSCProfit implements Sequence { 
 public double getSValue() { 
 if (totalnumplays > 0) 
 return (double) 0.5*(cumulSCprofit/(double)totalnumplays); 
 else 
 return 0;; 
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}
}
class SeqLoyal implements Sequence { 
 public double getSValue() { 
 return (double) num[Loyal]; 
 }
}
class SeqPractical implements Sequence { 
 public double getSValue() { 
 return (double) num[Practical]; 
 }
}
class SeqTraitor implements Sequence { 
 public double getSValue() { 
 return (double) num[Traitor]; 
 }
}
public void setup() { 
 super.setup(); 
 params = new String[] {"grid_Side","prob_Loyal", "prob_Practical", 
 "prob_Traitor", "prob_Change", "smoothing_Const", "MaxSearches_PerDay"}; 
 
if (graph != null) 
 graph.dispose(); 
 if (graph1 != null) 
 graph1.dispose(); 
 if (dsurfN != null) 
 dsurfN.dispose(); 
 if (dsurfS != null) 
 dsurfS.dispose(); 
 if (dsurfE != null) 
 dsurfE.dispose(); 
 if (dsurfW != null) 
 dsurfW.dispose(); 
 
dsurfN = new DisplaySurface(this, "Northen Region"); 
 dsurfS = new DisplaySurface(this, "Southern Region"); 
 dsurfE = new DisplaySurface(this, "Eastern Region"); 
 dsurfW = new DisplaySurface(this, "Western Region"); 
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registerDisplaySurface("Main", dsurfN); 
 registerDisplaySurface("Main", dsurfS); 
 registerDisplaySurface("Main", dsurfE); 
 registerDisplaySurface("Main", dsurfW); 
 
}
public void buildModel() { 
 
super.buildModel(); 
 
graph = new OpenSequenceGraph("Real Time Distribution of Trader Types", this); 
 graph.setXRange(0, 100); 
 graph.setYRange(0.0, (double) agentPopulation); 
 graph.setAxisTitles("Hours", "Number of Traders"); 
 
graph.addSequence("Loyal", new SeqLoyal(), Color.green); 
 graph.addSequence("Practical", new SeqPractical(), Color.blue); 
 graph.addSequence("Traitor", new SeqTraitor(), Color.red); 
 
graph.display(); 
 graph.step(); 
 
graph1 = new OpenSequenceGraph("Mean Trader Profit Graph", this); 
 graph1.setXRange(0, 100); 
 graph1.setYRange(0.0, 5.0); 
 graph1.setAxisTitles("Hours", "Profit"); 
 
graph1.addSequence("", new SeqCumSCProfit(), Color.cyan); 
 
graph1.display(); 
 graph1.step(); 
 
DisplayConstants.CELL_WIDTH = 6; 
 DisplayConstants.CELL_HEIGHT = 6; 
 
Object2DDisplay displayN = new Object2DDisplay(Region_N); 
 Object2DDisplay displayS = new Object2DDisplay(Region_S); 
 Object2DDisplay displayE = new Object2DDisplay(Region_E); 
 Object2DDisplay displayW = new Object2DDisplay(Region_W); 
 
displayN.setObjectList(agentListN); 
 displayS.setObjectList(agentListS); 
 displayE.setObjectList(agentListE); 
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displayW.setObjectList(agentListW); 
 
dsurfN.addDisplayableProbeable(displayN, "Northen Region"); 
 dsurfS.addDisplayableProbeable(displayS, "Southern Region"); 
 dsurfE.addDisplayableProbeable(displayE, "Eastern Region"); 
 dsurfW.addDisplayableProbeable(displayW, "Western Region"); 
 
addSimEventListener(dsurfN); 
 addSimEventListener(dsurfS); 
 addSimEventListener(dsurfE); 
 addSimEventListener(dsurfW); 
 
dsurfN.display(); 
 dsurfS.display(); 
 dsurfE.display(); 
 dsurfW.display(); 
 
}
public void step() { 
 
super.step(); 
 
graph.step(); 
 graph1.step(); 
 dsurfN.updateDisplay(); 
 dsurfS.updateDisplay(); 
 dsurfE.updateDisplay(); 
 dsurfW.updateDisplay(); 
 
}
public int getgrid_Side() { 
 return grid_Side; 
 }
public void setgrid_Side(int n) { 
 grid_Side = n; 
 }
public double getprob_Loyal() { 
 return prob_Loyal; 
 }
public void setprob_Loyal(double p) { 
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prob_Loyal = p; 
 }
public double getprob_Practical() { 
 return prob_Practical; 
 }
public void setprob_Practical(double p) { 
 prob_Practical = p; 
 }
public double getprob_Traitor() { 
 return prob_Traitor; 
 }
public void setprob_Traitor(double p) { 
 prob_Traitor = p; 
 }
public double getprob_Change() { 
 return prob_Change; 
 }
public double getsmoothing_Const() { 
 return smoothing_Const; 
 }
public void setsmoothing_Const(double p) { 
 smoothing_Const = p; 
 }
public void setprob_Change(double p) { 
 prob_Change = p; 
 }
public static void main(String[] args) { 
 SimInit init = new SimInit(); 
 
DSCM m = new DSCMGraphics(); 
 init.loadModel(m, null, false); 
 }
}
package shriganesha.dscm.Decentralized_Supply_Chain_Model; 
import uchicago.src.sim.util.SimUtilities; 
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import java.awt.Color; 
import uchicago.src.sim.gui.*; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
 
public class SupplyChainAgent implements Drawable { 
 final int C = 1; 
 final int D = 0; 
 final String[] actionToString = {"D", "C"}; 
 public final int ifLoyal[] = {C, C, D};  
 public final int ifPractical[] = {C, C, D};  
 public final int ifTraiter[] = {C, D, D};  
 
double TRS; 
 int Category; 
 int Status; 
 int x, y; 
 DSCM model; 
 int playerID; 
 SupplyChainAgent BusinessPartner; 
 int type; 
 int newType; 
 int[][] profitMatrix = { {1,5}, 
 {0,3} };  
 int action; 
 int memory; 
 int totalProfit; 
 int numPlays; 
 ArrayList pastBusinessPartners; 
 
public SupplyChainAgent (int i, double trs, int status, int category,  int t, DSCM m) { 
 TRS = trs; 
 Status = status; 
 Category = category; 
 type = t; 
 model = m; 
 playerID = i; 
 pastBusinessPartners = new ArrayList(); 
 }
public void status() { 
 if ( TRS <= 0 ) { 
 if (model.getNextDoubleFromTo(0.0,1.0) < model.prob_Change) { 
 Status = 0; 
 }
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}
}
public void placeTo(int a, int b) { 
 x = a; 
 y = b;
}
public void reset() { 
 numPlays = 0; 
 totalProfit = 0; 
 pastBusinessPartners.clear(); 
 }
public void remember() { 
 memory = BusinessPartner.action; 
 }
public void beginDealing(int time) { 
 numPlays++; 
 if (time == 1) 
 action = ifLoyal[type]; 
 else 
 if (memory == C) 
 action = ifPractical[type]; 
 else 
 action = ifTraiter[type]; 
 }
public void profitSum() { 
 totalProfit = totalProfit + profitMatrix[action][BusinessPartner.action]; 
 if (action > 0)  
 model.cumulSCprofit = model.cumulSCprofit + 
profitMatrix[action][BusinessPartner.action]; 
 else 
 model.cumulSCprofit = model.cumulSCprofit - 
profitMatrix[action][BusinessPartner.action]; 
 }
public void strategyDeciding() { 
 newType = type; 
 if (model.getNextDoubleFromTo(0.0,1.0) < model.prob_Change) { 
 SimUtilities.shuffle(model.agentList); 
 double bestPayoff = getAveragePayoff(); 
 Iterator i = model.agentList.iterator(); 
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while (i.hasNext()) { 
 SupplyChainAgent aPlayer = (SupplyChainAgent)i.next(); 
 double payoff = aPlayer.getAveragePayoff(); 
 if (payoff > bestPayoff) { 
 bestPayoff = payoff; 
 newType = aPlayer.type; 
 }
}
}
}
public void updateType() { 
 type = newType; 
 }
public double getAveragePayoff() { 
 if (numPlays == 0) 
 return -9.999; 
 else 
 return (double)totalProfit/(double)numPlays; 
 }
public int getX() { 
 return x; 
 }
public int getY() { 
 return y; 
 }
public double getcumulSCprofit() { 
 if (model.totalnumplays > 0) 
 return (double) 0.5*(model.cumulSCprofit/(double)model.totalnumplays); 
 else 
 return 0; 
 }
public int getType () { 
 return type; 
 }
public void setType (int v) { 
 type = v; 
 }
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final Color COLOR[] = {Color.green, Color.blue, Color.red, Color.magenta}; 
 
public void draw(SimGraphics g) { 
 g.setDrawingParameters( DisplayConstants.CELL_WIDTH * 2 / 3, 
 DisplayConstants.CELL_HEIGHT * 2 / 3, 
 DisplayConstants.CELL_DEPTH * 2 / 3 ); 
 g.drawFastRoundRect(COLOR[type]); 
 }
}
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